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Recording industry revenue has fallen sharply in the last three years, and some  ￿ but not all  ￿
observers attribute this to file sharing. We collect new data on albums obtained via purchase and
downloading, as well as the consumers’’ valuations of these albums, among a sample of US college
students in 2003. We provide new estimates of sales displacement induced by downloading using
both  OLS  and  an  instrumental  variables  approach  using  access  to  broadband  as  a source  of
exogenous variation in downloading. Each album download reduces purchases by about 0.2 in our
sample, although possibly much more. Our valuation data allow us to measure the effects of
downloading on welfare as well as expenditure in a subsample of Penn undergraduates, and we find
that downloading reduces their per capita expenditure (on hit albums released 1999-2003) from $126
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No black flags with skull and crossbones, no cutlasses, cannons, or daggers identify today’s pirates. You can’t see them 
coming; there’s no warning shot across your bow. Yet rest assured the pirates are out there because today there is 
plenty of gold (and platinum and diamonds) to be had. – RIAA website (http://www.riaa.com/issues/piracy/default.asp) 
 
  After growing an average of 10 percent per year over the previous 7 years, US music 
industry revenue has shrunk by 16 percent in the last 3 years (see figure 1).  There is considerable 
debate about causes.  Theoretical work on sharing of information products has ambiguous 
predictions for the effects of file sharing on industry revenue (see Besen, 1986; Bakos, 
Brynjolffson, and Lichtman, 1999; Varian, 2000; and Shapiro and Varian, 1999); and the empirical 
literature on the sales-displacing effects of music downloading has achieved no consensus as yet.  
Two recent studies reach opposite conclusions (see Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf, 2004, and 
Zentner, 2003). 
  One obstacle to empirical consensus is the difficulty of obtaining suitable data, namely 
information on purchase and download volumes for the same individuals.  This study examines the 
effect of downloading on sales and welfare, asking a series of specific questions.  First, using a new 
survey-based dataset on quantities of music downloading and purchases of 8200 albums by 412 
college students at Penn, CCNY, Hunter, and master’s students at Chicago’s Harris School, we 
revisit the question of how downloading affects music purchases.  Using both OLS as well as an 
empirical strategy instrumenting downloading volumes with information about broadband access, 
we ask whether individuals downloading more albums purchase fewer albums.  We document that 
downloading reduces music purchases, by roughly one fifth of a sale for each recent download and 
possibly much more.  Because we have measures of the quantities of music purchased and 
downloaded, we can estimate the size of the downloading-induced sales displacement, not simply 
document whether it occurred.  Our conservative estimates indicate that downloading reduced 
recent purchases by individuals in the sample by about 10 percent during 2003.   2
We then turn to welfare analysis.  Two features of the CD market make the welfare analysis 
of downloading interesting.  First, because CDs were easily transferable even in the absence of 
downloading, substantial price discrimination was impracticable.   As a result, firms were 
compelled to price as single-price monopolists, leaving some socially beneficial transactions (with 
buyer valuation above marginal cost) unconsummated.   This problem was exacerbated by CDs’ 
second feature:  the product has a low marginal cost – now that digital distribution is feasible, it is 
essentially a marketable public good – so the market without unpaid downloading has the potential 
for substantial deadweight loss. 
The advent of unpaid downloading allows consumers to engage in a crude “do-it-yourself” 
form of third degree price discrimination.  Based on access to the Internet and willingness to 
engage in file sharing, consumers segment themselves into downloaders and buyers.  Given the 
available supply of music, downloaders pay zero and are clearly better off.  But that leaves various 
avenues for downloading to affect welfare more generally.  Revenue may decline, harming firms 
and their suppliers.  But revenue will only decline if downloaded albums would otherwise have 
been purchased.  If downloaded albums would not have been purchased, then not only is revenue 
unaffected but deadweight loss shrinks as well.
1 
  We address these issues though surveys asking respondents not just what they bought and 
downloaded but also how highly they value the music in dollar terms.  We document that, on 
average, our respondents download music that they value a third to a half less than their purchased 
music.  This indicates that at least some of the music that is downloaded would not otherwise have 
been purchased and therefore supports the incomplete sales displacement that we document.  
                                                 
1Downloading might also two have other interesting effects outside the scope of the current study. First, downloading 
may change the residual (non-downloader) demand for music in a way causes firms to change prices, harming or 
helping actual buyers.  Second, downloading may change the supply of available music in ways that ultimately change 
consumers’ options. 
   3
Moreover, it suggests that some of the surplus enjoyed by downloaders would otherwise have been 
the deadweight loss associated with a foregone but socially beneficial transaction. 
  Music has the complicating feature of being an experience good, so that consumers’ ex ante 
valuation (at the time of purchase or downloading) need not be the same as the ex post valuation 
after experiencing the product.  Hence, the ex post valuation, relevant to welfare, deviates from the 
valuation determining the purchase decision.  To address this we administered an additional survey 
to 92 Penn students eliciting both ex ante and ex post valuation information for 1209 purchased and 
downloaded music albums.  Assuming that albums with ex ante valuations above $15 would have 
been purchased, while those with ex ante valuations below $15 would not, we find that 
downloading reduces expenditures by individuals in this sub-sample by roughly 20 percent, from 
$126 to $101 per capita.  Although downloading reduces revenue by $25 per capita, it raises 
consumer surplus by $70 per capita (for their purchases of hit albums, 1999-2003).  The reduction 
in deadweight loss ($45 per capita) is nearly double the reduction in industry revenue (from 
individuals in our sample). 
  The paper proceeds in four sections.  Section 1 provides industry background and links to 
relevant literatures.  Section 2 explores possible effects of downloading on consumption and 
welfare in theory.  Section 3 describes the data used in the study.  Section 4 presents empirical 
results on sales displacement and whether high or low valuation albums are downloaded.  Section 4 
also presents estimates of the effects of downloading on welfare. 
 
I.  Background 
a.  Industry background   4
The US music industry is highly concentrated.  Although there are hundreds of “labels,” 
five owners account for 80 percent of music sales.  The major firms include Sony, Vivendi-
Universal, EMI, Bertelsman, and Time-Warner (see Graves, 2004).  According to some reports, 
there are nearly 30,000 CDs released per year.  The major labels collectively release about 7000.
2  
Sales are very highly concentrated, though.  In 2000 the top 250 (100, 50, 10) albums accounted for 
48 (32, 22, 8) percent of total sales.  Sales in other years are similarly skewed. 
After increasing about 10 percent per year 1993-1999, US album sales have declined 16 
percent since (see figure 1).  The recording industry, represented by the Recording Industry 
Association of America (RIAA), blames illegal downloading, which they term “piracy” for sales 
displacement.  “Each year, the industry loses about $4.2 billion to piracy worldwide -- "we estimate 
we lose millions of dollars a day to all forms of piracy."”
3   The decline in demand is substantial 
enough to encourage consolidation. Sony and Bertelsman have had discussions, and EMI and Time 
Warner have been rumored to be in discussions (see Helmore, 2003). 
Other developments are suggestive of downloading.  Internet penetration has increased 
from 16 percent in 1997 to 47 percent in 2000.  And broadband connection, allowing convenient 
downloading of large files, stood in early 2003 at 40 percent of connected households.  Moreover, 
the sales of a important complementary goods, MP3 players and blank CDs, has increased 
substantially over the past five years.  MP3 player sales grew from 0.5 million yearly in 1999 to an 
estimated 2.1 million in 2003 (according to CEA Market Research).  Of course, one can use such 
goods for purchased as well as downloaded music, so these developments are merely suggestive of 
illegal downloading. 
                                                 
2 These figures, reported at http://www.azoz.com/music/features/0008.html, are attributed to RIAA. 
3 See http://www.riaa.com/issues/piracy/default.asp (accessed January 9, 2004).   5
Concerned with reductions in revenue – and convinced that music downloading is the cause 
– the industry has initiated hundreds of lawsuits against ordinary downloaders as a means of 
deterring downloading activity.  There is some evidence that the lawsuits are having an effect 
(Schwartz, 2004).  In concert, Universal reduced its list prices by 30 percent in October 2003 (USA 
Today, 2003). 
The music industry, initially slow to offer sales over the web, has moved recently to make 
music available online.  They were preceded by Apple Computer, maker of the leading MP3 
player, who launched their iTunes music site in 2002.  There consumers can download music for 
$0.99 per song.   As of March 2004, customers had downloaded 50 million songs from iTunes (see 
Apple Computer, 2004). 
 
b. Relevant Literature 
This study is related to three strands of academic research.  First, our general question, of 
how differentiated product firms’ ability to harvest revenue from potential buyers limits the types 
of products the firm can market, relates to the product selection problem discussed by Spence 
(1976) and Dixit and Stiglitz (1977).  In general, the structure of demand suggests what set of 
products would optimally be offered.  Which products are actually offered in a market depends on 
how well firms can appropriate consumers’ valuation as revenue whether firms can appropriate.  Of 
course, downloading substantially undermines the ability of firms to appropriate valuations as 
revenue. 
Closer to the phenomenon, our study is related to existing research on the effect of 
reproduction technology on markets for information goods, beginning with Leibowitz (1985).  
Liebowitz documents that the advent of widespread photocopying induced academic journal   6
publishers to raise their prices to libraries as they lost much of the individual market to 
photocopiers.  The issues addressed in this study also echo the issues in the software piracy 
literature.
4     
This paper is also part of a literature on the effect of file sharing on the revenue from selling 
information.  A number of theoretical papers make the point that file-sharing need not reduce seller 
revenue (see Bakos, Brynjolffson, and Lichtman, 1999; and Varian, 2000).   To see this, imagine 
two individuals each valuing a good below its price.  If they can share it, they may together be 
willing to purchase the good that they alone were not willing to buy.  Shapiro and Varian (1999) 
also emphasize possible sales-stimulating effects of free samples.  Thus, for a number of reasons, 
whether file sharing displaces sales is an empirical question. 
Finally, this is one of a number of recent studies of the effect of music downloading on 
album sales.  Liebowitz (2003) examines a variety of possible explanations for the recent 
reductions in album sales and, finding them all wanting, concludes that downloading must be 
responsible.  Zentner (2003) uses international time series aggregate data, in conjunction with 
Internet connectedness, to document that places with more Internet – and broadband – connections 
have experienced sharper reductions in album sales.  He also uses micro data to show that persons 
who self-report downloading music – instrumented with measures of technical sophistication – are 
also less likely to have purchased music recently.  Hui and Png (2003), using international panel 
data, 1994-1998, estimate that each download reduces sales by 0.42.  The time period they study 
predates the growth of broadband and widespread file sharing.  Moreover, their measure of piracy 
has the shortcoming that it is an estimate based in part on the level of legitimate sales in a country. 
On the other hand, Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf (OS, 2004) examine weekly time series 
data on downloading and sales of major hit albums, finding little relationship.  And in expert 
                                                 
4 See Besen (1986), Conner and Rumelt (1991), Takeyama (1997).   7
testimony on the Napster case, Fader (2000) argues that file sharing stimulates sales of recorded 
music, although his analysis covers a period prior to the sales decline depicted in figure 1. 
  It is difficult to obtain data well suited to measuring the possible sales-displacing effects of 
downloading.  Album sales data exist, by album and by time.  OS have combined weekly sales data 
with novel data on the weekly volume of downloads to ask whether albums are purchased less 
when in the weeks when they are downloaded more heavily.   They identify sales displacement 
using within-album weekly variation in downloading and sales.  In effect, they ask whether an 
album sells fewer copies in a week that it is downloaded frequently.  Given the durable nature of 
music files, it is not clear that the absence of contemporaneous substitution rules out substitution 
more generally.  
Their contemporaneous album sales approach faces the basic handicap that the variation in 
a particular album’s popularity over time would tend to induce a positive relationship between 
purchases and downloads.  Purchase and download are simply two ways of obtaining an album.  To 
see this clearly, consider a different pair of channels for obtaining an album, from Sam Goody or 
from HMV.    Virtually no one purchases a particular album from both outlets.  Thus, the 
displacement is one-for-one.  Yet, the weekly sales of a particular album at Sam Goody are surely 
highly positively correlated the weekly sales of the same album at HMV.  Do HMV sales stimulate 
Sam Goody sales?  Probably not.  Downloading and purchases have the same problem.  An 
album’s popularity has a time component to it; and when it is popular though one distribution 
channel, it is popular through other channels as well.  And this does not mean that availability 
through one of the channels stimulates demand through other channels. 
  It is not even necessary for the relationship between album sales and downloads to inform 
the sales displacement question.  Suppose there are two types of people, buyers and downloaders.    8
Suppose that buyers never download, and downloaders never buy.  Then a negative correlation 
between sales and downloads across albums just means that buyers and downloaders have different 
tastes.  What we really want to know is whether a person’s downloading of an album reduces the 
probability that he will purchase the album.  Hence, it is not enough to have sales and downloads 
by album.    Rather, one needs data on sales and downloads by person, or groups of persons. 
  The ideal data for studying sales displacement would be volumes of sales and downloads, 
by individual rather than by album.  If one could find exogenous variation in downloading across 
individuals, then displacement could be inferred from the relationship between downloads and 
sales (i.e. “do people who download more albums, or songs, purchase fewer albums?”).   To our 
knowledge, surveys are the only way to obtain this information.   Zentner (2003) has made use of 
European individual-level survey data on music downloading and purchases, as well as a host of 
individual level characteristics.   Unfortunately, Zentner’s micro data include only binary measures 
of downloading and music purchase (do you download music?  Have you purchased music 
recently?), preventing him from measuring the size of downloading-induced sales displacement. 
A lack of alternative data sources led us to undertake our own surveys.  The benefit of this 
data collection is that it allowed us to get information on individuals’ volumes of music downloads 
and purchases.   Because we surveyed the college student populations available to us, our surveys 
are necessarily not nationally representative.  We cannot therefore draw inferences about the 
magnitude of aggregate downloading on US album sales.  But we can ask whether the sales 
displacement phenomenon operates at all. That is, do people who download more purchase less?  If 
so – and if we believe we have isolated exogenous variation in the volume of downloading – then 
we can at least draw inference about whether downloading – again for our sample – tends to 
stimulate or cannibalize album sales.  This is the spirit in which we proceed.   9
 
II.  Theory 
The possible effects of illegal downloading on welfare are best analyzed in two parts.  First, 
we discuss the analysis when there is no distinction between ex ante and ex post valuation with 
simple demand and supply examples.  This conveys much useful intuition but misses some 
important issues that arise with experience goods.  We then discuss how the analysis must be 
adapted for experience goods.  Throughout, we ignore possible effects on supply. 
a.  Effects of Downloading on Sales and Welfare 
Prior to the advent of unpaid downloading but after digital distribution is technically 
feasible, we view the seller of each album as a single-price monopolist in a context with essentially 
zero marginal costs.  For most demand structures, this will lead to deadweight loss, as sellers 
restrict output to maximize profit.  See figure 2, panel 1, which assumes zero marginal cost. 
Downloading segments demand into two groups.  Prior to downloading there is some 
overall demand function for music CDs, D(p) reflecting the distribution of consumers’ willingness 
to pay for music (each element along the function is a consumer-album).  The area under the 
overall demand curve provides a welfare baseline: with zero marginal costs, this area is the sum of 
revenue, consumer surplus, and deadweight loss.  After the advent of downloading, consumers 
divide themselves into buyers and downloaders, with aggregate valuation functions, DB(p) and 
DD(p), where at any price, DD(p) + DB(p)= D(p).  Note, however, that for downloaders the 
valuation function simply measures only hypothetical willingness to pay if downloading were not 
feasible. 
We can work through some simple illustrative examples, although a more realistic analysis 
require information on what D(p) and DB(p) actually look like, a topic we address empirically   10
below.  Still, the examples help to fix ideas.  First, consider a case with linear demand and in which 
downloaders are drawn uniformly from the overall demand distribution.  Then the buyer demand 
curve is simply an inward rotation of D(p).  One can easily show that downloading then raises 
consumer surplus, while reducing revenue and consumer surplus. Note that with linear demand the 
monopolist’s profit-maximizing price is invariant with rotations of the linear demand curve.   
Two other polar cases, illustrated in the remainder of figure 2, differing in whether highest 
or lowest value users download, are instructive.  First, consider a case in which low-value users 
download, in which the pre-downloading price is p.  When downloading is feasible, all users with 
valuations above p continue to purchase, while all consumers with valuations between p and 0, 
which is the marginal cost of downloading, download.  In this extreme case, revenue, and the 
consumer surplus of persons who bought prior to downloading, are unaffected by downloading.  
The deadweight loss existing prior to downloading is transformed into consumer surplus.  See 
panel 2. 
At another extreme, the high value consumers – say, those with valuations above p’ – could 
download.  For example, if p’= p, then regions representing CS and revenue prior to downloading 
become downloader surplus.  The region formerly representing DWL now contains revenue, 
additional CS as well as some deadweight loss if the price is above MC (as it would be for a profit-
maximizer).  See panel 3. 
While these special cases based on simple – and restrictive – representations of demand are 
suggestive, realistic analysis of the welfare effects of downloading require information about the 
actual distribution of valuations for buyers and downloaders.  The key question, for both the 
welfare analysis of downloading and the size of the sales displacement, is whether individuals 
download high or low-valuation albums.  The more that consumers obtain low-valuation music   11
through downloading, the smaller its negative impact on revenue and the greater its beneficial 
effect on welfare.   
 
b.  Decoupling Ex Ante and Ex Post Valuation 
Because music is an experience good, the ex ante valuation determining purchase is 
decoupled from the ex post valuation relevant to welfare.  As a result, actual welfare is slightly 
more complicated than the foregoing section would suggest.  At the time of first obtaining the 
album, the individual’s willingness to pay is based only on a guess about how much she will like an 
album.  Call this the ex ante valuation, 
a
i v , where “a” denotes ex ante, and (i) indexes a buyer-
album pair.  Her ex post valuation of the album, once she has listened to it for a while, can deviate 
from 
a
i v .  Term the ex post valuation 
p
i v , where the “p” denotes ex post.  Define pi as the purchase 
price the buyer faces.  Finally, each consumer-album pair has a binary willingness to download 
(di=1 if yes, 0 if no). 
There are two regimes, a downloading regime (when downloading without paying is 
feasible) and a non-downloading regime (when it is not).  When downloading is feasible, each 
consumer-album pair requires first a decision about willingness to download.  If di=1 (yes), then 
downloading occurs as long as 
a
i v >0 (regardless of whether the ex ante valuation exceeds the 
price). If di=0, then she purchases only if 
a
i v = pi.  If di=0 and 
a
i v < pi, she goes without, even though 
she has valuation in excess of downloading’s zero marginal cost. 
In the non-downloading regime, individuals purchase only when 
a
i v = pi, even though they 
have valuations in excess of marginal cost.  To make matters simple, assume that what is infeasible 
in the non-downloading regime is illegal downloading but that legal – and revenue-generating – 
 forms of zero-marginal cost distribution are available.      12
While individuals decide whether to obtain albums on the basis of (
a
i v ,di, pi), their ultimate 
satisfaction from the album depends on 
p
i v , less a price paid, if any.  Hence, CS=
p
i v  for 
downloaded albums, and it equals 
p
i v - pi for purchased albums.  Table 1 summarizes the 
circumstances in which people buy and download in the downloading and non-downloading 
regimes by partitioning space according to whether di=1, and whether 
a
i v = pi. 
One point bears discussion here.  Because our survey – discussed below – elicits 
information only about albums that individuals have in their possession (either via purchase or 
downloading), we will have data on v
a, v
p, and d for only three of the four cells in the tables.  We 
have no valuation information about albums that people are willing neither to download nor to 
purchase (with d = 0 and 
a
i v < pi ).  Note, however, that the deadweight loss in this cell is identical 
across downloading and non-downloading regimes, so that our inability to measure this will not 
inhibit our ability to measure the change in welfare from downloading. 
 
III.  Data 
The basic data for this study are derived from two surveys administered to roughly 500 
college students (at Penn, Hunter, Chicago’s MA program in public policy, and CCNY) between 
December 2003 and February 2004.  The first survey, administered to 412 students, elicits 
information on the respondent (age, race, gender, family income number of CDs owned, speed of 
Internet access, as well as interest in music), along with ex post valuation on two groups of albums 
purchased or downloaded: those obtained in the last year, and those among a common list of 261 
hit albums released since 1999.   13
Table 2 presents some characteristics of the individuals in the survey one sample.  Blacks 
make up 9 percent of the sample, Hispanics 10 percent, Asians 32.  The remainder are white.  
Fourteen percent of the sample has family income below $25 thousand; 20 percent has family 
income between $25 and $50 thousand; 28 percent has family income between $50 and $100 
thousand; 22 percent has family income between $100 and $250 thousand, and the remaining 16 
percent has family income in excess of $250 thousand.   The mean age is 21.9. 
The respondents report high interest in music.  Only 15 percent report being less of a music 
fan than others they know.  Nearly forty percent claim to be about the same, 30 percent are 
somewhat more, and 17 percent are a lot more interested in music than others they know.   The 
mean CD collection is 103. 
In a second wave of the first survey we asked about current and past Internet access.  We 
obtained this information on 260 of the 412 respondents.  Seventy percent report having dialup 
access in 1999, while 21 percent had broadband (DSL, cable modem, or Ethernet) access in 1999.  
By 2003, roughly 85 percent had high speed access, while the remainder had dialup access. 
Respondent characteristics vary substantially across the universities sampled.  Chicago and 
Penn are heavily white and Asian, while Hunter and especially CCNY have larger black and 
Hispanic populations.  Chicago income is low because the MA students tend to report their own, as 
opposed to parents’, income (note their comparatively high ages).  Penn income is substantially 
higher than elsewhere.  Reported interest in music is somewhat higher at Penn and Hunter than 
elsewhere.  Finally, patterns of Internet access differ substantially across school.  Penn students, 
most living in wired dorms, have virtually 100 percent broadband access.  Rates elsewhere are 
much lower.   14
The second part of survey one asks respondents to attach dollar value to two groups of 
albums they have.  First, we present them with a list of all 261 albums certified by the RIAA as 
having sold 2 million or more copies since 1999.  For each album, respondents indicate whether 
they own it, how they got it, and how highly they value it in dollar terms.  We term this the “hit” 
module, and responses to this module provide valuations on a common set of albums across all 
respondents.  Second, we ask respondents to list all albums they have obtained in the past year.  For 
each album they list, we ask them how they obtained it (via purchase, downloading, or as a gift) as 
well as their valuation.  We term this the “current” module.  
Two different versions of the valuation question were used initially.  The “buy” set asked 
respondents, “Imagine you no longer have the album and must pay to get it.  What is the maximum 
you are willing to pay to get the album.”  In the alternative “sell” treatment, the question is worded, 
“Imagine someone offered to pay you money to permanently give up the album (and never again 
hear any of the songs on it).  For each album, how much compensation would you require never to 
hear it again?”  We employed the buy formulation for 337 of 412 surveys. 
We use the survey data in two ways.  First, we can aggregate them to the respondent level 
to create a cross-respondent dataset on the volume of CDs purchased and downloaded.  Although 
we do not know when respondents purchased each CD, we do know the CDs’ “vintage,” i.e. the 
year in which they were first certified.  This allows us to create a second, panel dataset on the 
numbers of albums downloaded and purchased, among those of each vintage.   Third, we can use 
the data at the album level. 
Table 3 reports mean and median valuations of purchased (including gifts) and downloaded 
hit and current albums using both the buy and sell valuation methods.  The first point to note is that 
sell-based valuations are enormous.  The average purchased hit is valued at over $50,000.  While   15
the means are sensitive to outliers, even the median sell valuations - $100 per album for hits and 
current albums – are rather high.  The buy-based valuations appear to be more reasonable.  Of 2726 
purchased hits, the mean valuation is $12.70, while the mean valuation of a purchased current 
album is $15.25.  Second, downloaded albums are valued substantially below purchased albums.   
Although more reasonable in the sense of being within an order of magnitude of purchase 
prices, the survey 1 buy valuation data are still, at first blush, puzzlingly low.  Of 2726 purchased 
albums valued via the buy method, the mean valuation was $12.70.  On its face this seems to 
contradict logic, since a person should only buy a product if the value equals or exceeds the price.  
And, indeed, 58 percent were valued below $15.  Moreover, 28 percent were valued below $10.  
These results raised concerns for us that music may be a) an experience good, b) subject to 
depreciation as listeners grow tired of music, or c) both. 
Low ex post valuations are not just a theoretical curiosity; they also prevent using survey 1 
valuation data to determine which downloaded albums would have been purchased absent 
downloading.  It seems natural to assume that individuals would have purchased albums when v>p.  
Yet, it is not true that v exceeds p for all, or even most, purchased albums. 
Our concern about music as an experience good led us to administer survey two to 92 Penn 
students, asking about both ex ante and ex post valuations of the 261 albums in the hit sample, as 
well as the individual characteristics covered in survey one.  Our valuation instructions on this 
survey were rather explicitly designed to elicit ex ante valuations at or above the prices paid: 
Initial valuation - At the time you obtained the album, what is the maximum you would have been willing to 
pay for it?  If you paid for it, you must have valued it at least as much as its price initially.  For this question, 
suppose that there is only one possible source.  That is, your answer should not be based on an alternative 
price or sharing opportunity.  (Don’t say you’re not willing to pay since you know you can obtain it via 
sharing for free, or that you are not willing to pay more than some particular amount since you know you can 
buy from another seller for some particular price.  Here, you are asked to assume no such alternative sources 
exist.) 
Finally, if you would have been willing to purchase it at the time you downloaded it or received it as a gift, 
report a valuation at or above the going price at that time.   16
Current valuation - Now that you’ve had the music for a while, what is the maximum you would be willing 
to pay for it?  Here, again, suppose that there is only one possible source so your answer, as above, should not 
be based on an alternative price or sharing opportunity. 
 
The last column of table 2 reports characteristics of the individuals in the survey 2 sample.  The 
bottom panel of table 3 reports ex ante and ex post valuations of hits from survey 2.  Here, the 
mean ex ante valuation is nearly $16, while the mean ex post valuation, at $13.39, is very similar to 
the (ex post) valuation in survey 1.  Two points merit discussion.  First, the ex post valuation is 
below the ex ante, indicating depreciation.  Second, the correlation of ex ante and ex post value is 
only about 0.6, indicating that most of the variation in ex post value is realized after purchase, so 
the experience good aspect of music is important. 
We supplement the survey data with information on aggregate sales data on all of our hits – 
as well as roughly 8000 other hit albums certified by RIAA – from the Recording Industry 
Association of America Website (RIAA.COM).  The source reports individual certifications.  An 
album is certified “gold” when it has sold 0.5 million units, “platinum” when it sells 1 million, and 
it receives a multiple platinum certification for each additional million copies sold.  An album 
released in, say, 1985, can continue to sell in subsequent years.  We attribute the additional sales 
leading to most recent certification to the year of the current certification.  This makes the 
certification-based data compatible with the RIAA aggregate sales data (except that the aggregate 
data also include albums selling fewer than 0.5 million copies).  RIAA also provides data on annual 
units sold and revenue.  Figure 1 shows the overall and certified album sales.  RIAA certified 
albums account for roughly three quarters of overall sales. 
Table 4 lists the top 40 albums in the hit sample, by number of appearances among the hit 
albums in our respondents’ collections.  The last column reports the certified sales of each album 
(as of late 2003).  Although we make no claims of representativeness in our sampling, the albums   17
with high sales tend to appear frequently in our sample.  For example, the Backstreet Boys and ‘N 
Sync albums which each sold over 10 million copies each appear among more than 50 of our 
respondents’ hit album collections. 
Table 5 presents the average number of purchases and downloads, in the current and hit 
samples, overall and by race and school.
5  Respondents report an average of 7.8 hit purchases and 
5.1 hit downloads (for albums first certified in 1999 and by late 2003 selling at least 2 million 
copies).  Blacks download fewer albums than others in the sample.  Penn students in our sample 
download substantially more albums than Hunter, CCNY, or Chicago students (7.2 hit albums as 
opposed to 2-3).  Interestingly, Penn students purchase fewer albums than the others, suggesting 
sales displacement. 
We can compare our self-reported purchase information with aggregate data on album sales.   
According to the RIAA, US album sales in 2002 totaled $11.233 billion.  Of this total, 11.5 
percent, or $1.292 billion, was sold to persons age 20-24.  According to the 2000 Census, there 
were 18.964 million persons in this age group in 2000.  Dividing, we get average annual 
expenditure of $68 per person aged 20-24.  Given the price of CDs this translates to just under 5 
albums per person.   Our respondents, by contrast, report purchasing an average of 2.6 albums in 
the past year. 
Table 6 describes music obtained by the respondents – and percent downloaded – for hit 
albums in our list, by date of first certification, 1999-2003.  The number obtained decline over time 
because albums released later have fewer years of sales exposure.  Roughly a third of hit albums 
released in 1999 are obtained by downloading.  The share rises to nearly half for albums released 
                                                 
5 In this paper we group albums received as gifts with purchases.  All exercises reported in the paper were also 
performed excluding gifts from purchases.  No substantive results change.   18
during 2002-3.  Relative reliance on downloading varies substantially across some groups in our 
sample, with Penn students downloading proportionally more than others in the sample. 
 
IV.  Sales Displacement 
a.   Does downloading reduce album sales?   
Aggregating our survey data to the respondent level creates data on album purchases and 
downloads for 412 individuals.  Of these, 364 have valid data on all variables needed for basic 
analysis of the hits.  Our first pass at the sales displacement question is through cross sectional 
regressions of the number of albums purchased on the number of albums downloaded and a host of 
controls.  In particular, we estimate the following equation: 
, i i i i D X P e a b + + =       (1) 
where:  i P is individual i’s purchases of albums from some set (either the hit or current), 
  i D is individual i’s downloads of albums (again from some set),  
i X includes characteristics of the individual such as their level of interest in music, race, 
and income, 
  i e  is unobserved characteristics, and  
a and b are coefficients to be estimated. 
Columns (1-3) of table 7 reports estimates of equation (1) using the entire hit album sample.  
In this equation, P is the total number of albums on the hit list (those albums selling 2 million or 
more between 1999 and 2003) that the individual has purchased, while D is the number of those 
albums that the person has obtained via downloading.   The first column shows that the estimated 
sales displacement coefficient a using the full time period is insignificantly different from zero.  
The result does not change if we control for school (column 2) or estimate a tobit rather than an   19
OLS model (column 3).  Columns (4-6) present estimates of equation (1) using the current sample. 
The OLS regressions in columns (4) and (5) give displacement estimates of  –0.17 to –0.19, 
changing little when we control for school.  Column (6) reports a tobit estimate on the current 
sample, yielding a negative and significant displacement estimate.
6 
In interpreting these estimates, it is important to keep in mind that broadband Internet 
access stood at low levels for our respondents in 1999.  If a person is not connected, there is no 
scope for downloading to displace her purchases.  Many, if not most, of the persons in the sample 
purchased 1999 releases prior to having the ability to download.  The sales displacement question 
is addressed cleanly only when people have the ability to download albums at the time they might 
otherwise have purchased them.  These considerations suggest that recent years would be most 
useful for detecting possible displacement and explain why we see displacement in the current 
estimates but not for the 1999-2003 hits overall.  When we estimate equation (1) only on the hits 
first certified in 2003, we find displacement of –0.09 (p-val = 0.10, two-sided).   
The estimates in table 7 are vulnerable to the concern that downloading is endogenous, or at 
least that it is subject to unobserved heterogeneity.  We might expect music lovers to both 
download and purchase more music.  One way to deal with this is simply to recognize that it would 
lead OLS to underestimate the amount of sales displacement and to view our coefficients as 
underestimates of true sales displacement.  Alternatively, one can try to find instruments for music 
downloading that are not themselves related to music demand.   The speed of one’s access to the 
Internet can serve as such an instrument, provided that connection speed is exogenous to interest in 
music.  It would undermine this strategy, for example, if people chose high-speed connections 
because of their interest in music. 
                                                 
6 Because purchases are positive for 243 of 347 observations, the associated displacement estimate is –0.18.   20
We have two approaches to using access speed as an instrument for downloading.  First, we 
can use the school the student attends; and second, for a subsample, we can use whether she has 
broadband access.  Far more than college students at Hunter or CCNY, or MA students at Chicago, 
Penn students live in dormitories with high-speed Internet access.   “Only 612 of Hunter's 17,000 
students have the opportunity to live in the Residence Hall” ( see 
http://www.hunter.cuny.edu/~reslife/index.html).  And there are no dormitories at CCNY (see 
http://www.ccny.cuny.edu/bulletin02/about_usU.htm).  By contrast, there is space for 5683 of the 
“nearly 10,000 undergraduates” at Penn.  Our own survey shows this: broadband access is 
ubiquitous among Penn students, far less common among others.  Our two IV strategies are (1) to 
use which school they attend to instrument downloading, and (2) to use the survey’s individual  
measure of broadband access as an instruments. 
The first four columns of table 8 present first and second-stage regressions on the hit 
sample.  The first two columns report first-stage  (download) regressions, using school attended 
and the individual broadband access variables, respectively, as instruments for downloading.  As 
one would expect from the raw data in the tables above, Penn students download more than other 
students, after accounting for race, income, and interest in music.  Columns (3-4) report second-
stage hit displacement regressions, and the estimated hit sales displacement coefficients are –0.25 
and –0.57.  Columns (5-8) repeat the exercise using the current sample, and again, individuals with 
broadband access download more, and the estimated current sales displacement coefficients are  
-0.88 and –1.47.   The estimated IV displacement coefficients in table 8 are much larger than their 
OLS analogues in table 7, although they are also less precisely estimated.   21
The panel structure of our data allows another empirical approach.  Table 9 uses the panel 
data, in which a unit of observation is a person-by-vintage for the hit sample.  We estimate 
equations of the form: 
. it t it i it D X P e f a b + + + =  
Thus we run regressions of the number of albums released in each year that an individual 
purchased on the number of that year’s albums that the person downloads, along with time 
dummies (ft) and our various controls.  This pooled cross-section time series estimates give sales 
displacement coefficients of  roughly –0.04 but not significant.  The second column of table 9 
incorporates individual fixed effects, identifying the sales displacement coefficient from the 
relationship between changes in the tendency to download and changes in the tendency to 
purchase, over and above the common vintage pattern.  That is, we make the substitution eit = mi + 
nit, where mi is an individual-specific fixed effect, and nit is an individual-and-year-specific error.  
Here we obtain a coefficient estimate of -0.08, and it is statistically significantly.  When we restrict 
attention to persons purchasing more than 5 albums from the hit sample we get a coefficient twice 
as large (-0.15 and significant).  
What do all of these estimates mean?  Estimates based on data for periods when 
downloading is feasible suggest sales displacement of roughly –0.2 per album downloaded in the 
OLS specifications and much higher in the IV estimates.  Average current year downloads – see 
table 4 – were 1.24, while current purchases averaged 2.61. Using the –0.2 displacement estimate, 
in the absence of downloading, purchases would have averaged 2.86, suggesting that downloading 
reduced purchases by individuals in the sample by about 9 percent.  
 
b.  Do consumers download high or low value music?   22
Before analyzing the valuation data, it is worthwhile to discuss the virtues and shortcomings 
of survey-based valuation information.  Economists have traditionally been skeptical of surveys of 
valuation because a respondent’s valuation of an object he has never thought about – or never will 
see – may not have any meaning (Diamond and Hausman, 1994).  In our context, however, we are 
asking about familiar objects.  Indeed, we are in particular asking about objects that the 
respondents actually possess.  Moreover, these are objects of a sort the respondents have obtained 
repeatedly, so their valuation responses may be more meaningful than responses about unfamiliar 
and largely hypothetical goods. 
Hence, we are willing to put aside qualms about survey valuation data to ask whether 
downloading is a means of obtaining high or low valuation albums.  To this end, Table 10 reports 
album-level regressions of log valuation on a downloading dummy.  The top panel reports 
regressions of log (ex post) valuation on a downloading dummy, using data from survey one.  Only 
buy valuation data are included in these regressions (to ensure comparability with survey two 
results).  The first column shows that downloaded hits are valued 33 percent below purchased hits.  
The second column shows that downloaded current albums are valued 39 percent less than 
purchased current albums.  Standard errors in all table 10 regressions are adjusted for clustering on 
individuals.  Columns (3) and (4) repeat the exercise with individual fixed effects, showing not 
only that downloaded albums are less valuable than purchased albums but also that this is true 
within individual. 
The bottom panel of table 10 performs a similar exercise on the ex ante and ex post hit 
valuation information from sample two.  As in sample one, the ex post valuations of downloaded 
albums are nearly a third (27 percent) less than the valuations for purchased albums.   The ex ante 
valuations of downloaded albums, relative to purchased albums, however, are even lower than the   23
ex post valuations (46 percent vs 27).  At the time of obtaining the music, then, persons expect the 
albums they download to be much less valuable to them than purchased music.  This suggests that 
they would not have been willing to pay much for this music, and that they would not likely have 
purchased it.  But the coefficient estimate describes only the average valuation difference between 
downloaded and purchased CDs.  A more thorough analysis of downloading requires information 
about the full structure of ex ante valuation (for demand) and ex post valuation (for welfare). 
 
c.  Ex Ante and Ex Post Valuation of Music 
This section provides some descriptive characterization of the ex ante and ex post valuation 
data.  For each album, we asked for an ex ante valuation, a price (if they purchased the album), an 
ex post valuation, as well as indicators for why the current valuation deviated (from the initial 
valuation).  If the current valuation exceeded the initial valuation, we allowed respondents to 
indicate a) that they were pleasantly surprised, b) that the music grew on them, or c) both.  If the 
current valuation equaled the initial, we allowed respondents to indicate that a) they were familiar 
with the music before purchase, b) they guessed right, or c) both.  Finally, if the current valuation 
fell short of the initial valuation, we allowed respondents to indicate that a) they were disappointed 
from the start, b) they grew tired of the music, or c) both. 
The data are described in table 11.  The average ex ante valuation is $13.34, while the 
average ex post valuation is $11.94 for the 1209 albums in sample two, indicating depreciation.  
Respondents report higher ex post than ex ante valuations because of pleasant surprise at 16.4 
percent of albums and that 16.5 percent of albums grew on them.  Respondents report equal ex post 
and ex ante valuations: 21.8 percent of albums were familiar before purchase, and respondents 
guessed accurately on the value of 11.5 percent of albums.  Finally, respondents report lower ex   24
post than ex ante valuations for many albums.  9.5 percent of albums are disappointing from the 
start, while respondents grew tired of 31.7 percent of albums.  
These data also allow us to explore the distributions of ex ante and ex post valuations and 
therefore what the determinants of purchase decisions and welfare look like.  The top panel of 
figure 3 depicts the distribution of ex ante valuations, ordered from highest to lowest ex ante 
valuations.  The curve is, in effect, a demand curve, since points above any price indicate a 
willingness for an individual to purchase an album.  It is worth noting that their demand curve does 
not appear to belong to any familiar parametric family.  If ex ante valuations, which are guesses 
about how much the person will like an album, are not accurate, then the area under the demand 
curve does not represent welfare. 
The second panel of the figure shows the distribution of ex post valuations, ordered by ex 
post valuations.  This curve is not relevant to purchase decisions, since the valuations are not 
known at the time of purchase.  These valuations are relevant to welfare, however.  The curves in 
the two panels look very similar, but one needs to bear in mind that they are ranked by different 
variables. 
Figure 4 illustrates the distinction between ex ante and ex post valuation more directly.  The 
top panel reproduces the ex ante curve (the line) with ex post valuations overlayed as open circles.  
It is clear that many purchases with high ex ante value have low ex post value, and vice versa.  The 
bottom panel shows the same information in a different way, with a plot of ex post valuation on ex 
ante valuation and a 45 degree line. This diagram too shows that, while ex ante and ex post 
valuations are correlated, the correlation, at 0.63, is far from perfect.  Moreover, the preponderance 
of dots below the 45 degree line indicates depreciation overall.   25
Column (1) of table 11 reports a regression of ex post valuation on ex ante valuation and 
dummies that reflect, for example, whether an individual has grown tired of an album.  The 
coefficient on “grew tired” is negative and significant. 
The true ex post valuation of an album is the sum over the flow utilities experienced, 
appropriately discounted.  If the flow utility declines over time, then the current valuation of a three 
year old album will understate its original ex post value.  To address this we examine average 
depreciation directly, via a regression of (ex post valuation – ex ante valuation) on dummies for 
year of release.
7  Albums released in 1999 are on average $3 less valuable than albums released in 
2003, and the earlier the release, the greater the gap, which we interpret as depreciation.  
Consequently, we adjust ex post valuation by adding back the average depreciation depicted in 
column (2) of table 11.  By construction this equalizes average ex ante and ex post valuation. 
Table 12 presents the average depreciation
8, along with the averages of the indicators for 
pleasant surprise, etc, for albums by artists appearing 15 or more times in sample two.  The artists 
are sorted from least to most depreciated.  For example, respondents adjusted ex post valuation of 
the Red Hot Chili Peppers’ record exceeds their ex ante valuation by an average of 31 percent.  
Nearly a third report being pleasantly surprised by their album, and almost half report that their 
album grew on them.  Albums by the Beatles, Norah Jones, and U2 also appreciated substantially.  
At the other end of the spectrum, albums by various artists
9 depreciated by an average of 92 
percent.  Nearly half of respondents with albums by various artists report growing tired of them.  
Similarly, over 80 percent of Britney Spears album owners report having grown tired of their 
albums. 
                                                 
7 We don’t know the year the individual obtained the album, but we assume earlier acquisition of albums released 
sooner.  
8 We calculate depreciation as ln(ex post valuation/ex ante valuation). 
9 These are primarily albums in the “Now, That’s What I Call Music!” series.   26
 
 
d.   Simulating the Effects of Downloading on Sales and Welfare 
  We now turn to measuring the welfare effects of downloading directly for a subsample.  
Given that we have data on ex ante and ex post valuations for respondents in the second Penn 
sample, we can calculate their expenditure, consumer surplus, and the number of albums purchased 
and downloaded (in the downloading regime) straightforwardly according to the scheme in table 1.     
Assuming that pi is $15, all of the information required to simulate expenditure, consumer 
surplus, and deadweight loss is available in table 13.
10  Of the 1209 albums in sample 2 obtained 
under the downloading regime, 617 albums were purchased, while 592 albums were downloaded 
by the 92 persons in the ex post-ex ante valuation sub-sample.  The buyers paid $15 per album, 
generating revenue of $9255.  Buyers experienced ex post valuations of $14.94 per album, giving 
rise to buyer consumer surplus of -$37.
11  The 154 downloaded albums that would have been 
purchased are valued at $17.91 each, generating $2738 in surplus.  In conjunction with the 438 
albums that would not have been purchased and which are ultimately valued at $9.48 each, the total 
downloader surplus is $6910, and the overall consumer surplus under downloading is $6873. 
  If downloading were not feasible, the 617 purchased albums would still be purchased, as 
would 154 downloaded albums with ex ante valuations of $15 or more, generating revenue of 
$11,565 from this sample.  Sales and revenue – since prices are assumed constant – are 20 percent 
lower with downloading than without.  Consumer surplus would include both the -$37 from those 
                                                 
10 We asked prices paid for albums in survey 2.  The mean price paid was $15.30.  The simulation results do not change 
in important ways if we use different prices (for example $13, 14, or 16). 
11 Note that negative consumer surplus is ruled out by construction with ex ante valuations but is possible with ex post 
valuation realizations below prices paid.   27
albums which were purchased along with $448 from the 154 albums which would have been 
purchased generating $17.91 in ex post valuation on average, for a total of  
-$411 in consumer surplus.  Finally, the sum of the ex post valuations of the albums which would 
not have been purchased (with ex ante valuations below $15) generate deadweight losses of $4152. 
  In per capita terms, consumers spend $126 without downloading and $101 with 
downloading.  Downloading increases consumer welfare by $70 per capita for sample individuals.  
Nearly two thirds (64 percent) of this derives from the $45 per capita reduction in deadweight loss.  
The remaining 36 percent comes from the $25 per capita reduction in spending. 
  If we compute consumer surplus and deadweight loss using ex ante rather than ex post 
music valuations (see the last part of table 13), the results are similar.  Downloading raises 
consumer welfare for sample individuals by $64 per capita, and 60 percent of this results from the 
$39 per capita reduction in deadweight loss. 
 
e.  Other Issues 
 
We administered a small-scale follow-up survey to address two questions left unanswered 
by the previous analysis, the relationship between song and album downloads and the tendency for 
people to purchase albums following downloading.  
Our surveys asked respondents to indicate whether they had obtained “albums” via sharing.  
As table 5 indicates, Penn students report downloading roughly as many albums as they purchase 
(about 7.2).   Yet, music downloading is done song by song, raising a question of what it means to 
“download an album.”
 12   To address this we administered a follow up survey asking 25 Penn 
students asking how many songs they had obtained via sharing from each of the albums in the hit 
                                                 
12 When respondents to the earlier asked how to fill out the survey, they were told to include an album if they had 
obtained they parts they though were valuable to them.   28
sample.  For these students the mean number of purchased albums is 6.96, just slightly below the 
full Penn sample average.  The average number of albums from which they had obtained at least 
one song via sharing was 19.7, or more than double the number of “albums” they reported 
obtaining via sharing.  On the other hand, they report downloading an average of only 4.0 entire 
albums.   It appears, then, that including all albums from which they download 6 or more songs, 
they obtained 4.1 albums via sharing.  Constructing successively more inclusive sharing measures, 
we get the following: including 5 or more songs yields 4.6; 4 or more yields 6.3; 3 or more yields 
8.8; and 2 or more yields 14.3.  It therefore appears that respondents reported obtaining an album if 
they have downloaded 3 or 4 (or more) of its songs. 
The follow-up survey also allows us to examine whether people download, then buy.  Of 
the 476 albums – or album fragments – obtained via sharing, respondents subsequently purchased 
21, or 4.4 percent. 
 
V.  Conclusion 
We argue that successfully measuring the possible sales-displacing effect of unpaid music 
downloading requires data on the quantities of purchases and downloads made by individuals, 
leading us to conduct original surveys.  Using a variety of empirical approaches, we document that 
downloading displaces sales among a convenience sample of college students.  The estimate we 
consider most conservative indicate that an additional download reduces sales by between 0.1 and 
0.2 units.  As a result, for the individuals in our sample, downloading reduced expenditure by about 
10 percent but possibly much more.  Supporting incomplete sales displacement is our finding that 
downloaded music is valued much less than purchased music.     29
While downloading reduces expenditure (on hit albums, 1999-2003) by $25 per capita in 
the sub-sample for which we perform a direct welfare analysis of downloading, it raises sample 
consumers’ welfare associated with these albums by $70 per capita.  Some of the benefit to 
consumers are transfers from sellers, but most of the benefit ($45 per capita) comes from 
reductions in deadweight loss. 
  Two facts bear emphasis again.  First, our sample is not representative, so our results should 
not be generalized.  Second, our evaluation of welfare takes supply as given.  It is entirely possible 
that downloading has important effects on the quantity and types of music recorded and marketed 
in the first place.  This is an important area for further research.  30
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Table 1: Summary of Behavior and Welfare in Downloading and Non-Downloading Regimes 
 
1. DOWNLOADING REGIME (Illegal downloading is feasible) 
Ex ante valuations 
relative to price: 
Willing to download 
( 1 = i d ) 
Not willing to download 
( 0 = i d ) 
i
a
i p v < < 0   • 
p
i v = CS 
•  rev=0 
•  downloading occurs 
• 
p
i v = DWL 
•  rev=0 
•  album not obtained 




i p v ‡   • 
p
i v = CS 
•  rev=0 
•  downloading occurs 
• 
p
i v - pi = CS 
•  pi =revenue 
•  purchase occurs 
 
 
2. NON-DOWNLOADING REGIME (Illegal downloading is not feasible) 
Ex ante valuations 
relative to price: 
Would have been willing to 
download 
( 1 = i d ) 
Would not have been 
willing to download 
( 0 = i d ) 
i
a
i p v < < 0   • 
p
i v = DWL 
•  rev=0 
•  album not obtained 
• 
p
i v = DWL 
•  rev=0 
•  album not obtained 




i p v ‡   • 
p
i v - pi = CS 
•  pi =revenue 
•  purchase occurs 
• 
p
i v - pi = CS 
•  pi =revenue 
•  purchase occurs 
Note: Assume that zero marginal cost distribution is available when illegal downloading is not 
feasible.   33
Table 2: Respondent Characteristics 




Male  60% of 414  65% of 66  29.7% of 64  45.4% of 33  67.7% of 
251 
58% of 98 
             
Black  8.9   31.8  10.9  6.3  4.0  3.0 
Hispanic  9.8   33.3  3.1  25.0  3.2  1.0 
Asian  31.8  21.2  26.6  12.5  38.5  43.4 
White  48.2  13.6  59.4  53.1  53.8  52.5 
N  409  66  64  32  247  99 
             
Age  21.9/400  24.6  27.4  20.5  20.0  20.2 
             
<$25  14.3%  23  41.4  12.9  5.2  2.2 
$25-50k  19.8%  41.5  25.9  38.7  19.8  8.8 
$50-100  27.6%  29.2  17.2  29.3  27.6  36.3 
$100-250  21.9%  4.6  12.1  12.9  30.4  34.1 
>$250  16.4%  1.5  3.5  6.5  24.8  18.7 
N  384  65  58  31  230  91 
             
Fandom 1(low)  6.3  6.2  6.3  3.0  6.8  11.1 
2  9.2  9.2  10.9  6.1  9.2  10.1 
3  38.4  47.7  43.8  30.3  35.6  33.3 
4  29.6  18.5  12.3  36.4  33.2  29.3 
5  16.5  18.5  15.6  24.2  15.2  16.2 
             
Dialup ‘99  70.4%  85.2%  56.5%  Na  73.2%  76.0 
‘00  63.1%   82.1%  60.3%  Na  60.9%  59.8 
‘01  49.8%  77.8%  58.7%  Na  42.0%  29.9 
‘02  31.5%   63.0%  47.6%  Na  20.6%  20.6 
‘03  16.2%   53.6%  32.3%  Na  4.1%  4.1 
Present  15.2%   57.1%  30.6%  Na  2.4%  3.2 
             
Hi-speed ‘99  20.6%  0.0%  29.0%  Na  20.8%  17.7 
‘00  31.9%  7.1%  28.6%  Na  37.3%  38.1 
‘01  47.1%  18.5%  31.7%  Na  57.4%  69.1 
‘02  66.5%  33.3%  46.0%  Na  79.4%  79.4 
‘03  83.8%  46.4%  67.7%  Na  95.9%  95.9 
Present  86.0%  42.9%  69.4%  Na  97.6%  96.8 
N  260  28  63    170  97 
Collection  103.3  157.9  147.5  96.4  79.0  83.6   34
Table 3: Average Value of Hits and Current Purchases 
  hit      current     
  Mean  median  N  Mean  median  N 
SURVEY 1 (buy)             
Ex post             
  bought  12.70  12  2726  15.25  15  695 
  downloaded  8.81  8.5  1512  11.15  10  337 
             
SURVEY 1 (sell)             
Ex post             
  bought  56,344  100  702  1,831  100  173 
  downloaded  2,534  30  264  710  50  64 
             
SURVEY 2             
Ex ante             
  bought  15.91  15  617       
  downloaded  10.66  10  592       
Ex post             
  bought  13.39  13  617       
  downloaded  10.47  10  592         35
Table 4: Top 40 Sample Albums 
artist/album  sample freq  sample rank  sales (mil)  sales rank 
50 CENT / GET RICH OR DIE TRYIN'  112  1  5  34 
EMINEM / THE EMINEM SHOW  103  2  8  10 
COLDPLAY / A RUSH OF BLOOD TO THE HEAD  100  3  2  102 
EMINEM / THE MARSHALL MATHERS LP  88  4  8  11 
EMINEM / THE SLIM SHADY LP  87  5  4  45 
RED HOT CHILI PEPPERS / CALIFORNICATION  77  6  5  35 
2 PAC / GREATEST HITS  74  7  9  8 
SANTANA / SUPERNATURAL  69  8  14  1 
U2 / ALL THAT YOU CAN'T LEAVE BEHIND  68  9  3  59 
BEATLES, THE / 1  66  10  8  12 
MAYER, JOHN / ROOM FOR SQUARES  60  11  3  60 
JONES, NORAH / COME AWAY WITH ME  57  12  7  19 
DMX / FLESH OF MY FLESH, BLOOD OF MY BLO  56  13  3  61 
MATTHEWS, DAVE BAND / EVERYDAY  56  14  3  62 
'N SYNC / NO STRINGS ATTACHED  53  15  11  4 
BACKSTREET BOYS / MILLENNIUM  52  16  13  2 
JAY-Z / THE BLUEPRINT  52  17  2  103 
NELLY / COUNTRY GRAMMAR  52  18  8  13 
CAREY, MARIAH / #1'S  50  19  5  36 
DMX / ...AND THEN THERE WAS X  49  20  5  37 
DR. DRE / DR. DRE 2001  49  21  6  23 
LINKIN PARK / HYBRID THEORY  49  22  8  14 
OUTKAST / STANKONIA  48  23  3  63 
BLINK 182 / ENEMA OF THE STATE  47  24  5  38 
MATCHBOX TWENTY / MAD SEASON  47  25  4  46 
CREED / HUMAN CLAY  46  26  10  6 
DIDO / NO ANGEL  46  27  4  47 
DOORS, THE / GREATEST HITS (1996)  45  28  2  104 
MADONNA / MUSIC  42  29  2  105 
JAY-Z / THE BLUEPRINT 2: THE GIFT AND TH  41  30  3  64 
DESTINY'S CHILD / SURVIVOR  40  31  4  48 
JAY-Z / VOL. 3...LIFE AND TIMES OF S. CA  40  32  3  65 
SPEARS, BRITNEY / ...BABY ONE MORE TIME  40  33  13  3 
'N SYNC / CELEBRITY  39  34  5  39 
ENYA / A DAY WITHOUT RAIN  39  35  6  24 
NOTORIOUS B.I.G. / BORN AGAIN  39  36  2  106 
SPEARS, BRITNEY / OOPS!...I DID IT AGAIN  39  37  9  9 
TIMBERLAKE, JUSTIN / JUSTIFIED  39  38  3  66 
2 PAC / UNTIL THE END OF TIME  37  39  3  67 
MOBY / PLAY  37  40  2  107 
   36
Table 5: Purchases and Downloads 
  Hit  hit  hit  current  current  current   
  purchase  download  N  purchase  download  N   
All  8.24  5.36  365  2.61  1.24  349   
               
Asian  6.74  7.98  108  1.98  1.16  101   
Black  9.53  2.34  32  3.34  1.31  32   
Hispanic  11.62  4.83  37  2.85  1.03  33   
White  8.31  4.55  184  2.75  1.35  179   
               
CCNY  10.96  3.24  54  2.90  0.63  52   
Chicago  8.21  2.25  56  2.82  0.54  57   
Hunter  11.13  1.72  32  3.96  0.56  27   
Penn  7.17  7.17  365  2.31  1.67  213   
   37
Table 6: Hit Purchases and Downloads, by Year of Albums’ First Certification 
    total  Total  CCNY  CCNY  Chicago  Chicago  Hunter  Hunter  Penn  Penn   























1999  32.9%  2.39  1.17  2.90  0.74  1.78  0.41  2.88  0.38  2.35  1.57   
2000  38.9%  2.43  1.55  3.32  0.92  2.33  0.69  3.34  0.53  2.12  2.07   
2001  41.7%  1.76  1.26  2.86  0.82  1.91  0.44  2.41  0.47  1.38  1.68   
2002  45.8%  1.28  1.08  1.60  0.52  1.61  0.67  1.43  0.19  1.09  1.45   
2003  46.4%  0.52  0.45  1.10  0.42  0.31  0.13  1.06  0.16  0.36  0.58   
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Table 7: OLS and Tobit Sales Displacement Estimates  
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
















      -0.1945  -0.1722  -0.2579   
        (0.0718)**  (0.0728)*  (0.1001)*   
Hit Downloads  -0.0266  -0.0085  -0.0310        -0.0910 
  (0.0521)  (0.0527)  (0.0598)        (0.0556) 
male  -3.3089  -3.5692  -4.4627  -0.6344  -0.6188  -1.0338   
  (0.9708)**  (1.0173)**  (1.1373)**  (0.3167)*  (0.3306)  (0.4419)*   
Fan = 2  4.0584  3.7992  8.0407  0.1022  0.0572  1.1415  0.3705 
  (2.4907)  (2.4789)  (2.9994)**  (0.8161)  (0.8161)  (1.2328)  (0.2494) 
Fan = 3  5.6050  5.3117  9.2048  0.9109  0.8855  2.4968  0.5430 
  (2.1314)**  (2.1219)*  (2.6438)**  (0.6982)  (0.6979)  (1.0789)*  (0.2128)* 
Fan = 4  6.7212  6.4736  10.6962  1.9665  1.9228  3.9187  0.6201 
  (2.1738)**  (2.1652)**  (2.6787)**  (0.7144)**  (0.7141)**  (1.0955)**  (0.2173)** 
Fan = 5  9.9391  9.5997  14.1591  2.6707  2.5686  4.8472  0.6221 
  (2.3228)**  (2.3144)**  (2.8243)**  (0.7518)**  (0.7527)**  (1.1391)**  (0.2327)** 
$25-50k  2.2034  1.6273  2.0517  0.5603  0.4071  0.4576  0.0848 
  (1.5629)  (1.5824)  (1.7785)  (0.4988)  (0.5089)  (0.6768)  (0.1564) 
$50-100  1.0381  1.1821  1.5687  0.2371  0.2931  0.1194  -0.0025 
  (1.3790)  (1.4304)  (1.6202)  (0.4659)  (0.4823)  (0.6504)  (0.1373) 
$100-250  0.7783  1.3815  2.2364  0.3413  0.5042  0.5354  0.0577 
  (1.4597)  (1.5420)  (1.7435)  (0.4827)  (0.5088)  (0.6845)  (0.1450) 
>$250  2.6972  3.4626  4.3480  0.4111  0.6026  0.5559  0.0485 
  (1.6185)  (1.7117)*  (1.9276)*  (0.5340)  (0.5647)  (0.7550)  (0.1606) 
black  1.7491  0.3582  0.6459  0.3397  0.2338  0.4188  0.7495 
  (1.7698)  (1.8678)  (2.0700)  (0.5682)  (0.5923)  (0.7799)  (0.1768)** 
hisp  1.7620  -0.0623  0.0169  -0.2467  -0.5010  -0.2740  0.2155 
  (1.6841)  (1.8210)  (2.0131)  (0.5553)  (0.6063)  (0.7901)  (0.1689) 
asian  -0.8649  -0.9258  -1.6524  -0.7525  -0.6987  -1.0400  0.2989 
  (1.1388)  (1.1535)  (1.3002)  (0.3611)*  (0.3667)  (0.4964)*  (0.1126)** 
Chicago    -3.5870  -3.9167    -0.3204  -0.5408   
    (1.9267)  (2.1508)    (0.6088)  (0.8167)   
Hunter    -1.4116  -1.3880    0.4883  0.6874   
    (2.0773)  (2.3001)    (0.7008)  (0.9171)   
Penn    -4.1112  -4.5066    -0.6275  -0.5965   
    (1.6526)*  (1.8442)*    (0.5351)  (0.7167)   
               
  OLS  OLS  tobit  OLS  OLS  tobit  OLS 
Constant  2.8597  6.4934  2.1786  1.7047  2.0768  0.0260  -0.1857 
  (2.2992)  (2.8164)*  (3.3257)  (0.7482)*  (0.9027)*  (1.3107)  (0.2214) 
Observations  364  364  364  347  347  347  364 
R-squared  0.12  0.14    0.14  0.15     
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.   39
Table 8: IV Estimates of Hit and Current Sales Displacement 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Sample  Hit  Hit  Hit  Hit  Current  Current  Current  Current 
Depend. Var  Download  Download  Purchase  Purchase  Download  Download  Purchase  Purchase 
Instrument  School   Individ.  School   Individ.  School   Individ.  School   Individ. 
Current 
Downloads 
            -0.8804  -1.4676 
              (0.4570)  (0.8502) 
Hit Downloads      -0.5719  -0.2563         
      (0.3334)  (0.4415)         
Broadband Access    3.9311        1.0707     
    (2.0540)        (0.5222)*     
male  0.1042  0.4737  -2.9788  -3.0819  0.5737  0.9173  -0.2050  0.4658 
  (1.0355)  (1.3606)  (1.1299)**  (1.1891)*  (0.2475)*  (0.3465)**  (0.4551)  (1.0341) 
Fan =2  3.3970  3.9291  5.8858  6.4379  0.6286  0.7874  0.4870  0.7147 
  (2.5165)  (3.3562)  (3.0582)  (3.1422)*  (0.6149)  (0.8373)  (0.9552)  (1.5463) 
Fan =3  6.0806  7.5175  8.8921  6.8162  0.7307  0.9770  1.3940  2.3849 
  (2.1350)**  (2.7380)**  (3.1421)**  (3.9991)  (0.5251)  (0.7038)  (0.8494)  (1.4629) 
Fan =4  5.8373  6.7521  9.8673  8.7015  0.8491  1.0916  2.5449  3.2605 
  (2.1814)**  (2.8182)*  (3.1280)**  (3.7107)*  (0.5368)  (0.7232)  (0.8912)**  (1.5214)* 
Fan =5  4.8969  5.3952  12.4919  9.9086  0.8452  1.3516  3.1924  4.8208 
  (2.3410)*  (3.0554)  (3.0726)**  (3.4224)**  (0.5661)  (0.7707)  (0.9150)**  (1.7036)** 
$25-50k  0.6323  1.1859  2.3412  3.5615  0.1678  -0.1327  0.6081  -0.0888 
  (1.6102)  (2.2458)  (1.7926)  (1.9947)  (0.3839)  (0.5638)  (0.5640)  (0.9854) 
$50-100  1.3031  1.8318  2.2499  1.5951  0.5565  0.4007  0.7611  1.0134 
  (1.4543)  (1.9315)  (1.7400)  (1.9552)  (0.3627)  (0.5105)  (0.6282)  (1.0181) 
$100-250  1.6783  0.9198  2.5392  0.1394  0.6131  0.4236  1.0042  0.9678 
  (1.5669)  (2.0122)  (1.9796)  (1.8480)  (0.3825)  (0.5225)  (0.6970)  (1.0653) 
>$250  0.9148  0.4349  4.1691  3.4247  0.6004  0.2875  1.1005  0.6888 
  (1.7415)  (2.2544)  (2.0549)*  (1.9585)  (0.4248)  (0.5968)  (0.7535)  (1.1256) 
black  -0.4683  0.1327  1.0382  0.8998  0.6541  0.8319  0.6239  0.3569 
  (1.9010)  (2.5156)  (2.0723)  (2.1152)  (0.4455)  (0.6096)  (0.6679)  (1.2014) 
hisp  2.2792  4.3455  2.3844  4.9284  0.4618  0.9973  -0.1939  1.1861 
  (1.8495)  (2.6193)  (1.9655)  (2.5741)  (0.4568)  (0.6604)  (0.6278)  (1.2501) 
asian  3.4776  5.8701  1.3554  0.7168  -0.0192  0.1463  -0.7229  -0.9885 
  (1.1592)**  (1.5129)**  (1.8671)  (2.8829)  (0.2767)  (0.3935)  (0.4081)  (0.6960) 
Chicago  0.0573        0.4089       
  (1.9611)        (0.4588)       
Hunter  -1.3440        0.0841       
  (2.1131)        (0.5288)       
Penn  3.6365        1.0906       
  (1.6707)*        (0.3994)**       
Constant  -4.1479  -6.7023  1.2116  1.7005  -1.0581  -1.4387  1.3955  1.1489 
  (2.8580)  (3.3334)*  (2.8147)  (2.9569)  (0.6787)  (0.8401)  (0.8686)  (1.3918) 
Observations  364  231  364  231  347  219  347  219 
                 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%   40
 
Table 9: Longitudinal Sales Displacement Estimates 
(hit sample) 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
  Purch's from yr.  Purch's from yr. 
all 
Purch's from yr. 
>5 
Dwnld's from yr.  -0.0447  -0.0789  -0.1565 
  (0.0458)  (0.0334)*  (0.0656)* 
d2000  0.0527  0.0656  0.2061 
  (0.1138)  (0.1137)  (0.2113) 
d2001  -0.6141  -0.6110  -0.9055 
  (0.0995)**  (0.1131)**  (0.2096)** 
d2002  -1.1111  -1.1141  -2.0608 
  (0.1185)**  (0.1131)**  (0.2096)** 
d2003  -1.8747  -1.8987  -3.5251 
  (0.1291)**  (0.1154)**  (0.2135)** 
Fan =2  0.9301     
  (0.2558)**     
Fan =3  1.2497     
  (0.2035)**     
Fan =4  1.4370     
  (0.2221)**     
Fan =5  2.0663     
  (0.3374)**     
$25-50k  0.3723     
  (0.2932)     
$50-100  0.1326     
  (0.2475)     
$100-250  0.0702     
  (0.2776)     
>$250  0.3923     
  (0.2710)     
black  0.4463     
  (0.3307)     
hisp  0.4105     
  (0.3766)     
asian  -0.0662     
  (0.2273)     
Constant  0.8397  2.4469  4.4216 
  (0.2218)**  (0.0885)**  (0.1625)** 
Observations  1820  1820  820 
R-squared  0.14  0.22  0.39 
method  OLS  FE  FE 
Number of 
individuals 
  364  164 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.   41
Table 10: Relative Valuation of Downloaded CDs 
a. Survey One – Ex Post Valuation (Hit and Current Samples) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 








  hit  current  hit  current 
Downloaded  -0.330  -0.390  -0.177  -0.238 
  (0.072)**  (0.089)**  (0.023)**  (0.041)** 
Constant  2.382  2.605  2.331  2.557 
  (0.037)**  (0.038)**  (0.011)**  (0.018)** 
Observations  4017  1011  4017  1011 
R-squared  0.05  0.08  0.02  0.04 
  OLS  OLS  FE  FE 
Number of 
individuals 
    284  226 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
   
 
b. Survey Two – Ex Ante and Ex Post Valuations (Hits Only) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  Log Ex Ante 
Valuation 
Log Ex Post 
Valuation 
Log Ex Ante 
Valuation 
Log Ex Post 
Valuation 
Downloaded  -0.4623  -0.2654  -0.2857  -0.0857 
  (0.0822)**  (0.1043)*  (0.0283)**  (0.0511) 
Constant  2.7104  2.3879  2.6253  2.3013 
  (0.0348)**  (0.0765)**  (0.0175)**  (0.0317)** 
Observations  1133  1133  1133  1133 
R-squared  0.15  0.02  0.09  0.00 
  OLS  OLS  FE  FE 
Number of 
individuals 
    93  92 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.  * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Table 11: Ex Ante and Ex Post Valuations 
    (1)  (2) 
  mean  Ex Post Valuation  Ex Post – 
Ex Ante 
Valuation 
Ex Ante Valuation  $13.34  0.8178   
    (0.0183)**   
Ex Post Valuation  $11.94     
ex ante and ex post correlation  0.6389     
       
Pleasantly surprised  16.4%  4.2537   
    (0.4657)**   
Grew on me  16.5%  4.7717   
    (0.4656)**   
Familiar before I 
bought 
21.8%  0.2707   
    (0.4921)   
Guessed right  11.5%  0.1277   
    (0.5110)   
Disappointed from 
start 
9.5%  -5.5276   
    (0.5782)**   
Grew tired of it   31.7%  -5.2951   
    (0.5028)**   
Released in 99      -3.1906 
      (0.7635)** 
Released in 00      -1.7907 
      (0.7534)* 
Released in 01      -1.7723 
      (0.7931)* 
Released in 02      -0.0587 
      (0.8038) 
Constant    1.6733  0.3375 
    (0.5214)**  (0.6831) 
Observations    1209  1209 
R-squared    0.74  0.03 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%   
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it  N 
RED HOT CHILI 
PEPPERS  31.3%  30.0%  43.3%  26.7%  10.0%  0.0%  13.3%  30 
BEATLES, THE  26.2%  25.9%  22.2%  33.3%  0.0%  0.0%  22.2%  27 
JONES, NORAH  17.4%  35.3%  58.8%  11.8%  5.9%  11.8%  11.8%  17 
U2  9.8%  18.8%  43.8%  18.8%  6.3%  6.3%  18.8%  16 
LINKIN PARK  9.8%  37.0%  14.8%  29.6%  7.4%  7.4%  14.8%  27 
DION, CELINE  9.7%  18.8%  0.0%  25.0%  12.5%  12.5%  31.3%  16 
COLDPLAY   6.3%  25.0%  27.8%  27.8%  22.2%  0.0%  8.3%  36 
2 PAC  1.9%  10.7%  25.0%  21.4%  7.1%  0.0%  42.9%  28 
EMINEM  0.7%  22.9%  21.4%  21.4%  8.6%  0.0%  31.4%  70 
SOUNDTRACK  0.0%  28.3%  23.9%  19.6%  6.5%  6.5%  23.9%  45 
DOORS, THE  -1.2%  12.5%  12.5%  25.0%  12.5%  6.3%  37.5%  16 
MATTHEWS, DAVE 
BAND  -5.2%  7.1%  19.0%  26.2%  14.3%  19.0%  26.2%  42 
MOBY  -6.2%  5.9%  5.9%  47.1%  5.9%  17.6%  17.6%  17 
MAYER, JOHN  -8.7%  31.3%  25.0%  18.8%  6.3%  6.3%  25.0%  16 
NELLY  -17.2%  15.8%  21.1%  15.8%  5.3%  5.3%  31.6%  19 
DESTINY'S CHILD  -20.2%  0.0%  6.7%  20.0%  20.0%  6.7%  46.7%  15 
50 CENT  -20.5%  17.4%  21.7%  17.4%  8.7%  0.0%  39.1%  23 
'N SYNC  -20.7%  4.8%  0.0%  4.8%  4.8%  14.3%  71.4%  21 
AGUILERA, CHRISTINA  -21.6%  10.3%  0.0%  10.3%  13.8%  10.3%  55.2%  29 
BLINK 182  -23.0%  6.7%  13.3%  6.7%  6.7%  26.7%  46.7%  15 
CAREY, MARIAH  -23.5%  0.0%  10.5%  26.3%  5.3%  31.6%  26.3%  19 
BACKSTREET BOYS  -24.5%  0.0%  0.0%  17.6%  5.9%  11.8%  64.7%  17 
DMX  -24.8%  10.5%  5.3%  21.1%  10.5%  10.5%  52.6%  19 
SPEARS, BRITNEY  -28.3%  0.0%  3.4%  6.9%  3.4%  3.4%  82.8%  29 
JA RULE  -48.4%  6.7%  0.0%  26.7%  0.0%  26.7%  40.0%  15 
JAY-Z  -52.4%  17.4%  0.0%  8.7%  17.4%  26.1%  34.8%  23 
VA RIOUS  -86.9%  10.0%  0.0%  5.0%  5.0%  10.0%  45.0%  15 
                 
                618 
Note: “depreciation” is log(adjusted ex post value/ex ante value).  Artists appear in this 
table if their albums appear 15+ times in the sample for survey 2.   44
Table 13: Revenue and Welfare with and without Downloading 







(adjusted)   
             
did buy  617  15  15.91  13.34  14.94   
             
Downloaded, but: 
  would buy if downloading  
  were not feasible  154  15  17.82  16.72  17.91   
             
  would not buy  438  Na  8.15  8.28  9.48   
             
             
  No Downloading  Downloading  Change   
  total  per capita  total  per capita  Total  per capita 
Quantity sold  771  8.38  617  6.71  -154  -1.67 
Quantity Downloaded  0  0  592  6.43  592   
Quantity Consumed  771  8.38  1209  13.41  438  4.76 
             
Revenue  $11,565  $126  $9,255  $101  -$2,310  -$25.1 
             
CS and DWL (ex post valuations)              
    Buyer CS  $411  $4.47  -$37  -$0.40  -$448  -$4.87 
    Downloader CS  $0  $0  $6,910  $75.1  $6,910  $75.1 
  CS total  $411  $4.47  $6,873  $74.7  $6,462  $70.2 
  DWL*  $4,152  $45.1  $0  $0  -$4152  -$45.1 
             
CS and DWL (ex ante valuations)             
    Buyer CS  $996  $10.82  $561  $6.10  -$434  -$4.72 
    Downloader CS  $0  $0.00  $6,314  $68.6  $6,314  $68.6 
  CS total   $996  $10.82  $6,875  $74.7  $5,880  $63.9 
  DWL   $3,570  $38.80  $0  $0.00  -$3,570  -$38.8 
             
Notes:  Based on 92 individuals in survey 2 sample. We assume that the price of albums 
is $15.  Welfare calculations based on ex post valuation adjusted for depreciation.  We 
assume that a downloaded album would have been purchased if the consumer’s ex ante 
valuation ‡ $15. 
* DWL in this table excludes foregone welfare from albums that consumers are unwilling 
to either purchase or download.  See table 1 and the surrounding text.   45
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Figure 2: Effects of Downloading on Welfare 
 
1. single-price monopoly - the market before downloading 
 
   
2. downloaders are low-valuation demanders 
 
3. downloaders are high-valuation demanders 
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Figure 4: The Demand Curve and Ex Post Valuation 
Ex Ante Rank
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